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Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment. By Judith A. Baer. * Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 1983. Pp. 308. $3 7.50 clothbound, $17.50
paperbound.
Daniel A. Farber**

This book makes two arguments. One is an attack on current
equal protection doctrine. This is not an especially hard argument
to make. It has been common knowledge for at least a decade
that equal protection law is a mess. Also, as Professor Baer points
out, the current doctrines (suspect classes, strict scrutiny, etc.) are
largely judicial inventions. They have only the weakest connection with the fourteenth amendment's language or history. The
book's other argument is that these current doctrines should be
replaced with much more liberal rules. Baer describes herself as a
"bleeding-heart liberal."' In this book, she attempts to provide a
constitutional basis for familiar liberal demands such as affirmative action, more money for the handicapped, limits on mandatory
retirement, legalization of homosexuality, and expanded rights for
children.
The temptation is to respond with the familiar refrain that
Baer's program should be addressed to legislatures rather than
federal judges. I will not do so here. That response has been
made too often and too well to require repetition. Besides, it's not
as if anyone else has solved the problem of judicial review. It
seems unfair to criticize Baer for failing to take on what may be
an impossible task. Indeed, it is beginning to look as if we could
spend the rest of human history debating theories of judicial review without making any significant progress.2 Sooner or later we
are going to have to stop worrying about the abstract question of
how to decide issues and get on with the concrete work of decid•
••
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I. J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1983).
2. As far as I can tell, the debate has not significantly advanced since the first half of
the 19th century, when rather similar arguments were made on both sides. For citations,
see Farber & Meunch, The ldealogica/ Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, I CoNST.
COMM. 235, 245-246 (1984).
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ing them. So, I will skip the usual business about democracy and
judicial restraint, and move on to the merits of Baer's proposals.
The flavor of her argument comes across best in her discussion of children's rights. Her central argument is quite simple:
One of the most important lessons I have learned in and from the women's liberation movement has been to suspect any generalizations about the abilities and
characteristics of groups of people-not only to question their validity, which is
easy. but to think about the reasons why such generalizations are made and the
purposes they serve. Such remarks as "Woman's place is in the home," "Twelveyear-olds aren't mature enough to decide where they want to live," and "Deaf
people can't be nurses"-all of which come into this book-are general statements that are hard to verify and may well be wrong. Less obviously, such remarks are ways of assigning roles and allocating power. They keep some people
in certain places and our of other places, which are thereby reserved for other
people. Such statements are ways of preserving inequality. That insight led me to
a central thesis of this work. 3

Perhaps Professor Baer finds this argument plausible because she
has previously devoted much attention to the evils of treating women as if they were children or physically handicapped.4 But
there is a considerable gap between "it's wrong to treat women as
children," and "it's wrong to treat children as children." No
doubt, the reasons for denying various rights to twelve-year-olds
are generalizations, and no doubt those generalizations are believed most fervently by many of the same people who are wrong
about women. But one might as well argue that cigarettes are safe
because doctors used to have stupid ideas about the harmfulness
of night vapors, and anyway "it's only a statistic that cigarettes
cause lung cancer."
This argument is not an aberration but instead is echoed
throughout the book.s For example, her concluding words on
children's rights are these:
I began this chapter by noting the general public acceptance that age-based discriminations have received. The ensuing discussion has shown that case law has
mirrored this acceptance. But the cases have also revealed the prevalence of assumptions that claims to equality must rest on capacity and competence; again
and again, laws are defended by generalizations about lack of competence. And
while these generalizations may be more accurate than some that have been made
about other groups, their application to individuals is limited. They correspond
better to the anti theory of equality than to the theory. And they are not compatible with a right to equal respect and concern, or with a commitment to individual
rights6

It never seems to have occurred to Professor Baer that individual3.
4.
5.
6.

J. BAER, supra note I. at II.

J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978).
See 1. BAER, supra note I, at 26, 30, 150, 158-59, 218, 273.
/d. at 189.

378

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:376

ized procedures may not be universally practical in a nation of 240
million, or that individualized treatment may lead to arbitrary results, or that statistical methods may often be more reliable than
individualized judgments. 1
Since Professor Baer thinks it wrong to legislate on the basis
of children's lack of competence, she naturally wants to give them
more adult rights. Logically, if children are to be treated as having the same capacities as adults, toddlers should be allowed to
vote, sit on juries, and work in factories (with student loans for
those who prefer school). Professor Baer is not prepared to go
quite as far as that,s but she is willing to go quite far indeed:
The question of how to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable restrictions on children is perplexing. Any argument for "children's rights," even so
limited an argument as I have made, is easy to trivializ.e. As one author asks,
what happens if "my son, who gets mad at going to bed at 10:30, goes to cciurt and
asks for a later bedtime?" The leading cases do not help us to make these
discriminations. . . .
But if courts begin to uphold children's claims, will such rulings encourage
bedtime litigation? Do not families and schools-and courts, too-need to maintain a considerable degree of control over children, and would such rulings not
make it harder for them to do so? I am not sure that they would, because they
only scratch the surface of children's disabilities. But if they did, I am not sure
that would be a bad idea. It is not clear to me why disrespect for a principal,
dawdling, or being with a child who steals a wallet should be punishable offenses.
The larger point is that it is not clear why the first, most powerful lessons that
children-who, after all, will grow up--must learn are obedience and respect for
authority. 9

This passage has several striking features. First is Professor
Baer's assumption that children are short adults, with the same
psychological need for independence from authority. Many who
have made studying children their life work would disagree. to Indeed, one has the distinct impression that Baer has read about
children but never actually met one.tt Second is the extraordinary
vagueness of her position.12 How can her proposal be assessed
7. See R. NISBETI & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS Of SOCIAL JUDGMENT 140-41 (1980); P. MEEHL, PsYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 81-89 (1973).
8. She grudgingly accepts compulsory education, see J. BAER, supra note I, at 187188, though she appears to have some doubts about the validity of child labor laws. See id.
at 157 (complaining that children are "not allowed to earn a living wage").
9. /d. at 188.
10. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoHNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS Of THE
CHILD

3-14, 124-25, 197-202, 206 (1979).

II. For example, she assumes that six-year-olds are fully capable of deciding whether
to go to school, except for the possibility that their selfish parents might pressure them not
to. J. BAER, supra note I, at 173.
12. This is also true of Professor Baer's discussion of the handicapped. a group she
never defines. If she were writing legislation (or a constitutional amendment), we would
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when she hasn't defined it clearly? Third is her cultural imperialism-the attempt to impose the middle class Dr. Spock on the rest
of society. The families who will suffer the most from government
intervention under Baer's proposal are probably those who suffer
the most today. They are the "lower class, ethnically or racially
different from the personnel of intervention agencies, [who] often
do not share the middle class values that those agencies believe
(on the basis of very little evidence) are vital to healthy child
development." 13
As the preceeding discussion suggests, this is a deeply flawed
book. But Professor Baer is clearly an intelligent, capable scholar.
Her research is broad; her writing is good; many of her remarks
are shrewd and trenchant. For example, she scores some very
good points against historians as good as Charles Fairman.I4 Her
treatment of affirmative action goes beyond the usual argument
that whites aren't stigmatized and attempts to take seriously some
of the counterarguments.Is Many of her comments on particular
cases are insightful. Why has a good scholar produced such a
weak book?
The answer, I think, can best be described as "creeping
Dworkinism."I6 In part this is a specific reference to Professor
Ronald Dworkin's imprint on Baer's work.n For instance, she
constantly refers to his slogan of "equal respect and concern" as
the core of her analysis. Is But more generally I mean the idea that
important social issues can be settled through philosophical analysis, by staring into our navels and thinking hard about Justice.
Typical of this is Professor Baer's insistence that transportation
certainly expect more clarity. Advocating a change in constitutional interpretation ought
to carry with it a similar requirement to specify the scope of the proposal.
13. Levy, The Rights of Parents, 3 B.Y.L.U. 693, 700 (1976). See also J. GoLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOHNIT, supra note 10, at 17.
14. Baer rightly chides Fairman and Raoul Berger for dismissing the drafters of the
founeenth amendment as muddled thinkers, as if legislators have to pass some kind of I.Q.
test before their intent counts. As Baer points out, the negative appraisals of the framers
are largely due to attempts to read 20th-century ideas into the 19th-century debates. See J.
BAER, supra note I, at 101.
15. She is seriously concerned that some affirmative action programs may be based
on demeaning stereotypes. She also acknowledges that some situations such as punishment
call for treatment on the basis of individual merit, and that affirmative action may in extreme cases place too heavy a burden on members of the majority. See id. at 149-51. This
is probably the most thoughtful pan of the book.
16. As the discussion in the text should make clear, I am referring to Ronald rather
than Andrea Dworkin, the feminist author.
17. At one point Baer comes very close to saying that the founeenth amendment
enacts Dworkin's book, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See ]. BAER, supra note I, at
268-69. She might have done better to focus on John Rawls's much more sophisticated and
thoughtful work, which Dworkin popularizes.
18. See J. BAER, supra note I, at 32, 34, 102, 129, 180, 189, 259, 262.
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methods for the handicapped are a matter of principle-of "equal
respect and concern"-rather than a matter of costs and benefits. t9
This tum toward philosophy (especially neo-Kantian philosophy)
seems to be enjoying great popularity among liberals at the
moment.
One reason for the attraction of neo-Kantian philosophy is
that it strips away almost everything concrete about human relations, leaving only a collection of atomistic individuals. This is an
attractive viewpoint, if like Baer you believe that families, communities, and other social institutions are primarily instruments of
oppression.2o Given this viewpoint, the normative human condition is the isolated individual, just as in Kantian analysis.21
Probably a more important reason for the tum toward philosophy is political. Liberals like Professor Baer have lost much of
their faith in legislatures and other democratic institutions. They
see the courts as the only salvation for individual rights. Professor
Baer, for example, has no hope of getting her program adopted
democratically. Despite the realities of Title VII, the Voting
Rights Act, and other major legislation,n she doubts whether legislatures have ever done much for equality. More important, she
says that "Americans do not believe in equality at all."23 The best
that can be done with such a benighted people is to coerce them
into doing the right thing; they will never do it voluntarily. If the
only forum for change is the courts, abstract principles seem more
appropriate than more empirical policy arguments.
In these respects, Dworkinism fits the perceived needs of
some liberals to free individuals from social institutions while
bypassing the democratic process. But it also has another appeal.
Looking out at the real world is risky. You never know what you
might find. Philosophical introspection is much less likely to tum
up any unpleasant surprises.
As Professor Baer's book helps show, Dworkinism has
proved a dangerous course for liberalism. It has helped lock liber19. /d. at 194, 209-10.
20. See J. BAER, supra note I, at 162 (parental power based on "physical prowess and
power of the family purpose"); id. at 166-67 (no evidence that parents generally act in
children's interest); id. at 173 (only reason for compulsory educallon 1s that otherwise selfish parents might prevent children from going to school).
21. For an excellent analysis of this point, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM A"'D THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
22. With the exception of one decade (1954-1964), it cenainly is unclear that the
Supreme Court has historically been a better guardian of minorities than Congress. See
Nowak, Professor Rodell, the Burger Court, and Public Opinion, I CoNsT. CoMM. 107. 111114 (1984).
23. J. BAER, supra note I, at 7.
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als into stale solutions by denying them fresh knowledge. It has
directed them away from legislatures and toward the courts, in
what appears likely to become an increasingly unprofitable search
for the Supreme Court's assistance. It has also distorted the liberal agenda. Affirmative action lends itself to Dworkinian analysis and gets a chapter in Baer's book. Black unemployment is not
suited to this analysis and receives not a single mention. Nor do
poverty or wealth raise significant issues for Professor Baer.
These issues need to get back on the liberal agenda. It is time, in
other words, for liberal legal thinkers to come out of their philosophical reverie and back into the real world.

